Joseph Smith v. Susquehanna University by unknown
2017 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-13-2017 
Joseph Smith v. Susquehanna University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017 
Recommended Citation 
"Joseph Smith v. Susquehanna University" (2017). 2017 Decisions. 527. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017/527 
This July is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2017 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
  
 
                                         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
____________ 
 
No. 16-3343 
____________ 
 
 
JOSEPH SMITH, 
     Appellant 
 
v. 
 
SUSQUEHANNA UNIVERSITY; SCOTT A. MOYER, individually and in his  
official capacity as officer of Susquehanna University Department of  
Public Safety; CURT BROWN, individually and in his official capacity  
as officer of Susquehanna University Department of Public Safety;  
THOMAS A. RAMBO, individually and in his official capacity as Assistant  
Vice President for Student Life and Director of Public Safety at Susquehanna University  
      
 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 4-14-cv-00116) 
District Judge:  Honorable Matthew W. Brann        
                 
                        
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on March 24, 2017 
 
Before:  SMITH, Chief Judge, JORDAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
 
(Opinion filed: July 13, 2017) 
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________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge 
 
 Joseph Smith appeals the District Court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of 
appellees Scott Moyer, Curt Brown, and Thomas Rambo on Smith’s claims for alleged 
violations of his Fourth Amendment rights.  For the reasons set forth below, we will 
affirm. 
I.1 
 Smith was a student at the private college, Susquehanna University, where he 
lived in a dormitory building on campus.  Pursuant to University policy,2 dormitory 
buildings “may be searched and items seized if there is reasonable cause to believe that a 
student(s) is using his or her room for a purpose in violation of federal, state, or local law 
or of university regulations.”  On the evening of January 23, 2012, a resident advisor in 
Smith’s dormitory building called the University’s Department of Public Safety and 
spoke with Public Safety Officer (PSO) Patty McGee to report an odor of marijuana 
outside Smith’s door.  McGee sent an email to Brown and Moyer, two other PSOs, 
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
1 As Smith’s claims were decided at summary judgment, we view all facts in the light 
most favorable to Smith and make all reasonable inferences in his favor.  American Eagle 
Outfitters v. Lyle & Scott Ltd., 584 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2009). 
2 The policy is contained in a student handbook which was given to Smith at the time of 
his enrollment at Susquehanna.   
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reporting her observations.  Nothing further was done that evening.  The next morning, 
Brown and Moyer approached Rambo, the Director of the Department of Public Safety, 
with McGee’s report.  Rambo determined that McGee’s observations were sufficient to 
establish reasonable cause,3 and authorized a search of Smith’s room.  Brown and Moyer 
proceeded to Smith’s room and announced their presence, but Smith did not consent to a 
search of the room. 
 What happened next is disputed.  Smith testified that Brown and Moyer “pushed 
the door open” and “forced [their] way into the room.”  According to Smith, Brown said 
he was a cop.  Smith also stated that both PSOs wore clothing that looked very much like 
a police uniform.  Smith acknowledged, however, that “it said Susquehanna University 
on the uniform” and that neither PSO had a gun, handcuffs, or a baton.  Brown and 
Moyer denied forcing their way into the room, and denied that either of them stated that 
they were police officers.  Smith then called his father, who remained on the line for the 
remainder of the encounter.4  Smith told his father that two “security people” had 
“[p]ushed into his room,” after which his father requested to be put on speaker phone.  At 
this point, Smith told his father that he was speaking to two security people. 
 The PSOs proceeded to search Smith’s room for fifteen minutes while Smith was 
present.  Smith and his father both testified that the officers found nothing during this 
                                                 
3 The parties do not dispute that any use of marijuana violates “federal, state, or local law 
or [] university regulations” for purposes of the administrative search provision of the 
university policy. 
4 Smith testified that he only called his father after Brown and Moyer began searching his 
room.  Brown and Moyer, on the other hand, testified that Smith called his father before 
they began the search.  
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period.  Then Smith was allowed to leave.  According to the PSOs the search continued 
after Smith left, lasting for approximately an hour.  Brown testified that their search 
recovered marijuana, hallucinogenic mushrooms, crack cocaine, and various drug 
paraphernalia.  Smith has denied possessing or using any drugs in his room.  The PSOs 
documented and confiscated the contraband drugs, removing them to a secure area on 
campus and notifying the local police department.  Police officers then took custody of 
the drugs and commenced drug possession charges against Smith.  Smith does not 
suggest that the police themselves took part in the search of his room, or were otherwise 
involved before being contacted by Brown and Moyer. 
 Smith was prosecuted for the drug offenses in the Court of Common Pleas for 
Snyder County.  During the course of his criminal prosecution, Smith moved to suppress 
the evidence recovered from his room as violative of the Fourth Amendment.  After 
hearing testimony from Smith, his father, and the PSOs, the judge made the following 
findings: 
 Based on the testimony presented, the Court does not 
find that state action was involved in the search of Mr. 
Smith’s room . . ..   
 The Court further finds that the search was conducted 
in accord with the Susquehanna University policy . . ..   
 The Court finds that the search conducted by DPS 
officers was based on reasonable belief that there were – the 
room was being used in violation of the law.5 
Thereafter, Smith entered a plea of nolo contendere to possession of a controlled 
substance and was sentenced to time served. 
                                                 
5 JA 227. 
 5 
 
 Smith brought suit under against Susquehanna University,6 Brown, Moyer, and 
Rambo, alleging that the search of his room violated the Fourth Amendment’s 
proscription on unreasonable searches and seizure and its state law analog.  He sought 
damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and injunctive and declaratory relief pursuant to 
Pennsylvania state law.  Following discovery, the District Court adopted a magistrate 
judge’s report and recommendation, granted summary judgment to the defendants on 
Smith’s Fourth Amendment claims, and closed the case.   
II.7 
 Smith appeals the entry of summary judgment on his claims against the three 
defendants, arguing that the District Court failed to appropriately consider his testimony 
and that of his father in finding that Brown, Moyer, and Rambo were not state actors and 
that the search was conducted in accordance with the University’s policy.  We exercise 
plenary review of a district court’s grant of summary judgment,8 and may affirm on any 
basis that is supported by the record.9 
 Our obligation to “give to a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect as 
would be given that judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment was 
rendered”10 precludes Smith from relitigating the question of whether Brown, Moyer, and 
                                                 
6 All claims against Susquehanna University were dismissed for insufficient allegations 
as to the existence of a formal policy or custom. 
7 The District Court had jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and 
we have jurisdiction over Smith’s appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
8 Nat’l Amusements Inc. v. Borough of Palmyra, 716 F.3d 57, 62 (3d Cir. 2013). 
9 Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011). 
10 Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984).  Thus, rulings on 
federal constitutional questions in state proceedings may continue to have preclusive 
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Rambo were state actors.   Under Pennsylvania law, “when an issue of fact or of law is 
actually litigated and determined by a valid final judgment, and determination of the issue 
was essential to judgment, the determination on that issue is conclusive in a subsequent 
action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.”11  Smith does not 
contest that the question of state action was actually litigated or was essential to the 
denial of his suppression motion; rather, he argues only that the suppression ruling 
followed by his plea of nolo contendere was not a “valid final judgment.” 
Pennsylvania courts have squarely held that collateral estoppel can block civil 
actions “once a criminal defendant has been convicted and sentenced . . ..”12  In 
Pennsylvania, therefore, a trial court’s interlocutory orders become final, and entitled to 
preclusive effect, upon a defendant’s conviction, even if there is no admission or finding 
of guilt.13  Thus, while Smith correctly notes that a nolo plea is not an admission of guilt, 
we have held that such pleas are indisputably “tantamount to a conviction,” and may be 
relied upon where the “fact of conviction, not the plea, . . . [is] the operative fact . . ..”14  
Here, therefore, acceptance of Smith’s nolo plea and his subsequent conviction rendered 
                                                                                                                                                             
effect in federal civil rights litigation.  See San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and Cty. of San 
Francisco, California, 545 U.S. 323, 343-44 (2005). 
11 McNeil v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 680 A.2d 1145, 1147-48 (Pa. 1996) 
(citation omitted). 
12 Shaffer v. Smith, 673 A.2d 872, 875 (Pa. 1996) (emphasis added). 
13 See Lapcevich v. Erie Ins. Exchange, 3 Pa. D. & C.4th 115, 120 (Pa. Ct. Comm. Pl. 
1988) (“In civil rights actions the decision of the trial court on a suppression motion 
followed by a conviction is the final judgment which by collateral estoppel prevents 
recovery in a civil suit for damages.”) (citations omitted). 
14 United States v. Poellnitz, 372 F.3d 562, 569 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted). 
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the denial of the suppression motion a final judgment entitled to preclusive effect.15  
Accordingly, we must give conclusive effect to the Court of Common Pleas’ 
determination that Brown, Moyer, and Rambo were not state actors in conducting the 
search of Smith’s room.  As claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may only lie against 
state actors,16 this determination mandates judgment in favor of the appellees on all of 
Smith’s federal constitutional claims.17  
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Smith is precluded from relitigating the 
question of whether Brown, Moyer, and Rambo were state actors in conducting a search 
of his dormitory room.  Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment. 
                                                 
15 The record makes abundantly clear that the Court of Common Pleas believed the 
suppression motion turned entirely on whether Brown and Moyer were state actors.  See 
JA. 227 (“The suppression issue rises or falls on whether what took place on January 
24th, 2012 constitutes state action.”).  Thus, the Court of Common Pleas’ resolution of 
the state action question was essential to its denial of the suppression motion. 
16 Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Thus, a plaintiff seeking to hold an 
individual liable under § 1983 must establish that she was deprived of a federal 
constitutional or statutory right by a state actor.”) (emphasis added). 
17 As such, we need not address any of Smith’s other contentions. 
